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THE SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES FOR THE EUROPEAN COURT,  
SEEN FROM THE OUTSIDE 
Laurence R. Helfer* 
This piece is adapted from an address delivered to a conference sponsored by the Council of  Europe and 
PluriCourts1 on The Long-Term Future of  the European Court of  Human Rights2 in Oslo, Norway on April 
7, 2014. 
* * * * 
This post addresses the successes and challenges for the European Court of  Human Rights (ECtHR), as 
seen from the outside. It draws upon my co-authored research on human rights systems outside of  Europe3 
to explain how these systems have responded to some of  the same challenges now facing the Council of  
Europe and the ECtHR. My main contention is that international human rights courts, wherever they are 
located, require sustained political and material support if  they are to thrive and grow over time. 
I illustrate this argument with examples from the Inter-American4 and African courts of  human rights5 and 
from lesser-known courts of  sub-regional legal systems in Africa—the Economic Community of  West 
African States (ECOWAS),6 the East African Community (EAC)7 and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC).8 The judges of  these courts often look to ECtHR case law for guidance. They are also 
aware of  the high level of  political and material support for the Strasbourg supervisory system. Just as these 
courts have drawn inspiration from the ECtHR, so too those who will shape the Court’s long-term future 
should consider both the achievements and the challenges that these regional and sub-regional systems have 
faced.9 In describing these positive and negative developments, I will focus on three issues—the evolution of  
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human rights jurisprudence, the politics of  compliance with court judgments, and government resistance and 
backlash. 
The evolution of  human rights jurisprudence. The innovative doctrines and principles pioneered by judges in 
Strasbourg10 are alive and well in other human rights systems. Interpretive tools such as the evolutionary 
nature of  human rights, the presumption that rights must be practical and effective, the creative and strategic 
approach to remedies, and cross-fertilization of  legal norms are commonplace in the case law of  all regional 
and sub-regional courts. For example, Inter-American judges have applied these doctrines in several types of  
cases, including the obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish the perpetrators of  past human rights 
violations,11 the prohibition of  amnesty for such violations,12 the rights of  LGBT persons,13 and affirmative 
measures to combat violence against women.14 Mtikila v. Tanzania,15 the first merits judgment of  the African 
Court of  Human and Peoples’ Rights decided in 2013, analyzes the decisions of  the other two regional 
human rights courts and the U.N. Human Rights Committee to support its conclusion that a ban on inde-
pendent candidates standing for election violates the African Charter. Among the most striking examples of  
creative legal interpretation appear in the case law of  the East African Court of  Justice16 and the SADC 
Tribunal.17 The judges of  those courts have cited references to human rights, the rule of  law and good gov-
ernance in the principles and objectives clauses18 of  treaties establishing the economic communities to justify 
expanding their jurisdiction to include human rights.19 
The politics of  compliance with international court judgments. These capacious interpretations have broadened the 
scope and reach of  international human rights law. But they have also engendered significant compliance 
challenges. All other things equal, the more expansive and far-reaching remedies a court requires, the greater 
the likelihood of  delay or resistance in implementing its judgments—in terms of  political will, capacity, and 
commitment of  resources. 
The Inter-American Court has the most ambitious approach to remedies,20 often specifying in exquisite 
detail the measures states must adopt. Governments have responded by implementing the easier and less 
politically costly remedies, with the result that partial compliance with the Inter-American Court’s judgments 
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is now commonplace.21 Human rights courts in Africa are more circumspect, reflecting the fact that these 
nascent tribunals are have fewer government or civil society allies22 to advocate for compliance with more 
ambitious remedial orders. In the Mtikila case,23 for example, the African Court directed Tanzania “to take 
constitutional, legislative and all other necessary measures within a reasonable time to remedy the violations 
found by the Court and to inform the Court of  the measures taken.” It did not, however, indicate which 
measures were necessary. A similar approach appears in the 2012 judgment of  the ECOWAS Court in Socio-
Economic Rights and Accountability Project v. Nigeria,24 a case involving environment damage by multinational oil 
companies in the Niger Delta. The Court found Nigeria responsible for failing to regulate the companies that 
had despoiled the area, but it rejected a demand for U.S. $1 billion as impractical. Instead, the judges ordered 
the government to “take all measures” to restore the environment, prevent future damage, and hold the 
perpetrators accountable—without, however, specifying how the government was to achieve these goals. 
Government resistance and backlash. Expansive legal interpretations and creative remedies are natural out-
growths of  maturing human rights systems in which judges regularly apply international law to a diverse array 
of  factual circumstances. Yet as courts have issued more rulings that touch on politically sensitive topics, they 
have increasingly encountered overt—and occasionally strident—opposition from some states. Adverse 
reactions include reductions in funding (an ongoing challenge in the Inter-American system25); restructuring 
the court (such as the creation of  the EACJ Appellate Division26 following a controversial 2005 decision27); 
and politicizing judicial appointments. More extreme responses include overt noncompliance to signal a 
government’s displeasure with specific rulings; unilateral treaty withdrawals28 (most recently, Venezuela’s 2013 
denunciation of  the American Convention29); threats to create a rival human rights regime (a possibility being 
explored by several left-leaning South American countries30); and even suspending the court and stripping its 
jurisdiction to hear complaints from private litigants (a rebuke of  the SADC Tribunal spearheaded by Zimba-
bwe in 201131). 
Implications for the long-term future of  the ECtHR. What lessons do these developments outside of  Europe hold 
for the ECtHR’s long-term future? First, the negative views recently expressed by some parliamentarians,32 
political leaders,33 and national judges34 in the Brighton Declaration,35 in judicial opinions, in public speeches, 
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and in academic writings may signal to the ECtHR the need for caution when expansively interpreting the 
Convention and fashioning remedies. This is not to suggest that the Court will abandon or significantly 
narrow the jurisprudential principles that it has so carefully developed. Rather, I foresee that these principles 
will be supplemented by other nuanced doctrines that enable the ECtHR to fine-tune the deference given to 
national decision-makers36 depending upon how faithfully they apply the Convention37—as interpreted in 
Strasbourg—within their respective national legal orders. 
Second, the positive feedback loop that induces states to implement ECtHR judgments is in danger of  
stalling. Over the last few decades, this virtuous circle has created a culture of  compliance38 that views adher-
ence to Strasbourg judgments as the norm and noncompliance as the problematic exception that can 
rightfully be challenged by other governments and civil society groups. As the Court has become more skilled 
at identifying systematic human rights violations,39 however, the delays in compliance40 by states responsible 
for those violations have lengthened and are becoming endemic in some countries. In addition to the ongoing 
harm to the thousands of  individuals whose rights continue to be violated, this trend risks generating a 
vicious circle in which government officials point to public criticisms of  the Court and compliance delays in 
other states to justify noncompliance in their own jurisdictions and to legitimize criticism of  those who 
advocate for adherence to ECtHR rulings. 
A final implication of  the challenges to human rights adjudication outside of  Europe relates to the possi-
bility of  a more widespread backlash against the ECtHR. Russia’s recent military and political interventions in 
the Ukraine, the tens of  thousands of  applications pending against Russia,41 and the government’s “tradition-
al values” campaign in the U.N. Human Rights Council42 and at home43 are ominous signs of  Russia’s 
growing dissatisfaction with the European Convention and the ECtHR. In fact, it is not beyond contempla-
tion that Russia will create a rival Eurasian human rights regime comprised of  a few allies in Eastern Europe 
and former Soviet republics in central Asia. The laws and institutions of  such a system may superficially 
resemble those of  the Council of  Europe. In reality, however, they would be much weaker. A Eurasian hu-
man rights mechanism need not involve Russia’s withdrawal from the European Convention—at least not 
initially. But even if  the country remains nominally subject to the ECtHR’s jurisdiction, its officials can point 
to the competing decisions of  Eurasian human rights bodies to justify and legitimize noncompliance with the 
Strasbourg Court’s judgments. 
In sum, the progressive evolution of  international human rights laws and institutions should never be taken 
for granted—even in Europe. To the contrary, these laws and institutions need to be actively nurtured and 
supported. Such nurturing and support includes providing judges and registry lawyers in Strasbourg with the 
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resources needed to process the backlog of  cases. It is far more important, however, to bolster the NGOs, 
bar associations, national judges, and academics who are the ECtHR’s crucial interlocutors and compliance 
constituencies. These domestic actors must have the material support and the political space to continue to 
pressure governments to live up to the aspirations they espoused when creating what remains the world’s 
most advanced international system for protecting human rights. 
